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In this paper we take a comparative look at capital flows to less-developed countries in two 
eras of financial globalization. The paper extends recent research on the developmental effects 
of international financial integration, long-term trends in capital mobility and “globalization 
in historical perspective”. Analyzing the patterns of international financial integration in the 
three decades of the classical gold standard and after 1990 we show that investment in 
developing countries was a central element of 19
th century financial globalization, but plays 
only a minor role today. The Lucas paradox of capital failing to flow from rich to poor has 
grown much stronger. In historical perspective, today’s financial globalization is marked by 
massive diversification flows between high-income economies and a relative marginalization 
of less-developed economies.  Whether less developed countries reap tangible benefits from financial globalization is a 
much-debated issue among economists and policy-makers. Most economists agree that the 
benefits can be substantial. International financial integration allows for risk sharing, 
consumption smoothing and the efficient allocation of capital. According to standard 
economic models financial globalization should create particular opportunities for less-
developed countries. Rich countries’ savings could finance much-needed investment in poor 
countries, increasing the rate of return on savings in industrial and economic growth in 
developing countries. Such theoretical arguments underpinned the policy of capital account 
liberalization in many parts of the developing world during the 1990s.  
Yet the celebration of the developmental benefits of financial globalization proved somewhat 
premature.
2 Empirical cross-country studies have found little discernible growth effects of 
financial opening (Rodrik, 1998; Edwards, 2001; Edison, Levine et al., 2002). Many scholars 
argue that the record of financial globalization is disappointing and doubt that it brings 
notable benefits to poor countries (Bhagwati, 1998; Tobin, 2000; Aizenman, Pinto et al., 
2004; Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2004). Maurice Obstfeld and Alan Taylor hold that 
“international investment in poor countries is at an all time low today” (2003, p.175). Also the 
research department of the International Monetary Fund (Prasad, Rogoff et al., 2003) and the 
liberal weekly Economist (The Economist, 2003) have become more sanguine about the 
developmental benefits of financial integration. In other words, the debate about 
globalization’s effects continues – and sometimes reminds of the old question, if a glass is 
half empty or half full. 
The present paper takes a comparative look at the patterns of international financial 
integration. What we aim to do is to benchmark the present to the past. It is well-known that 
financial globalization is not an unprecedented phenomenon. The world economy at the 
                                            
2 Throughout this paper we will use “international financial integration” and “financial globalization” 
interchangeably. Both are aggregate concepts referring to increasing integration of individual countries with 
international markets (Prasad, Rogoff, et al., 2003).   4
beginning of the 21st century has much in common with the early 20th century when – in the 
famous words of Maynard Keynes – the resident of London could "adventure his wealth in 
the natural resources and new enterprises of any quarter of the world, and share, without 
exertion or even trouble, in their prospective fruits and advantages” (Keynes, 1920, p.10). 
Given these historical parallels, we ask a simple comparative question: how did financial 
globalization perform now and then in channeling capital to poor economies? 
Another famous economist, Joseph Schumpeter, once wrote that “we need statistics not only 
for explaining things, but also in order to know what there is to be explained” (Schumpeter, 
1954, p. 14). Following Schumpeter’s advice, the main contribution of the present paper is to 
systematicize the available statistical evidence on the patterns of international investment in 
two eras of financial globalization, i.e. in the last fifteen years and in the three decades of the 
classical gold standard before WW1. The paper builds on and seeks to extend recent 
comparative studies on “globalization in historical perspective” (Twomey, 2000; Bordo et al., 
2003; Obstfeld and Taylor, 2003, 2004; Ferguson and Schularick, 2004; Flandreau and 
Zumer, 2004), but we also aim to contribute to research on long-term trends in international 
asset trade (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2001, 2003).
3 Previous studies have shown that the 
degree of market integration was high before WW1 – price measures, savings-investment 
correlations and current account imbalances support this conclusion (Bayoumi, 1990; Taylor, 
1996; Jones and Obstfeld, 1997; Taylor, 2002; Obstfeld and Taylor, 2003; Obstfeld and 
Taylor, 2004). A similar level of market integration was probably not reached again until the 
1990s. International financial integration in the course of the 20th century can thus be thought 
of as a U-curve – showing high capital mobility at the beginning and the end with a trough in 
the middle.  
                                            
3 “Globalization in historical perspective” is also the title of the most comprehensive collection of studies on the 
topic published by the National Bureau of Economic Research in 2003 (Bordo et al: 2003).    5
Important pioneering empirical work on capital flows to developing countries in the first era 
of financial globalization has already been done by O’Rourke and Williamson (2000), 
Twomey (2000), Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) as well as by Clemens and Williamson (2004). 
We intend to extend this literature in several ways, most importantly by making the 
comparison systematic: the first section of this paper looks at the “depth” of financial 
globalization now and then using a standard volume-based indicator for international financial 
integration. In the second part we determine the share of developing countries in global 
financial flows (and stocks) in both eras. The third section presents a portfolio model for 
international investment and investigates to what extent real-world capital flows in both eras 
conformed to the diversification model. In the fourth part, we take a closer quantitative look at 
the so-called Lucas paradox of missing rich-poor capital flows in both eras. Last but not least, 
we present new estimates for net capital movements between rich and poor countries.  
What do we find? Borrowing the title of Herbert Feis’ famous book on the history of 
European foreign investment before WW1, we can show that in the first era of financial 
globalization the rich nations were indeed “bankers to the world”. Almost half of all 
international investment before WW1 went to developing countries. But the patterns of 
international financial integration have changed dramatically. Rich-poor capital flows are no 
longer a central element of financial globalization. The Lucas paradox of capital failing to 
flow from rich to poor has grown much stronger. Foreign capital also played a more important 
economic role in the economic development of developing countries (in relation to their 
output) before WW1 than it does today. In addition, in the late 19
th and early 20
th century 
international financial integration has led to massive net capital flows to poor countries, 
whereas today net capital movements between developed and less-developed economies are 
by and large flat.    6
In brief, we will tell a tale of two different “globalizations”. While economic history shows  
that international financial integration can be a benign force for development, contemporary 
financial globalization performs poorly in this respect.  
 
I. International financial integration in the long-run 
 
Scale and scope of financial globalization before 1914 were truly impressive. Bonds of more 
than sixty governments and shares of companies from almost all continents and sectors were 
listed on European exchanges. London was the undisputed financial center of the world, but 
to some extent Berlin and Paris rivaled London’s position in the sovereign loan market (Feis, 
1965 [1930]). Restrictions on financial transactions were virtually absent, and cross-border 
financial flows reached unprecedented levels during the three decades of the classical gold 
standard. Between 1880 and 1914, Britain exported on average between four and five percent 
of her gross domestic product (GDP) abroad (Edelstein, 1982). Following in Britain's 
footsteps, the other developed European nations started to export capital in the last quarter of 
the 19th century and, after the turn of the century, also the United States joined the first global 
capital market boom as an exporter of capital. A similar boom of international finance took 
place in the three decades after the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system of fixed exchange 
rates and capital account restrictions (Eichengreen, 1998; Bordo, Eichengreen et al., 1999). 
From the late 1980s onwards, the liberalization of capital movements spread to the developing 
world. In the 1990s the global financial market was back. Financial globalization became a 
household word. 
What was the overall degree of international financial integration now and then? The broadest 
possible measure is a volume-based index of international financial integration (IFI) that has   7
been proposed by Lane and Ferretti (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2003). It relates the amount of 







IFI =           ( 1 )  
 
Estimates for the international assets of the main creditor nations for the year 1914 are 
available from historical statistics.
5 It is realistic to assume that on the eve of WW1 the 
combined international investments of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the United 
States – the four largest economies – were in the range of 7-8 billion pounds or about 35-40 
billion (current) US dollars.
 6 Data for other countries such as the smaller European capital 
exporters (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland) are more difficult to come by.
7 
However, 8-9 billion pounds or 40-45 billion US dollars (at historical prices) are generally 
accepted as the best possible estimate for the global stock of foreign investment assets in 1913 
(Maddison, 1995; O'Rourke and Williamson, 2000; Twomey, 2000; Obstfeld and Taylor, 
2003).   
If we try to calculate the degree of international financial integration for the pre-WW1 period, 
it turns out that the denominator – world GDP – is no less problematic than the numerator. A 
figure for world GDP in 1913 (at market prices) for the year 1913 is not available, because 
                                            
4 In principle, both gross international assets and international liabilities can be looked as they should be equal on 
a global level.  
5 These data are the subject of a long-standing debate among economic historians (Platt, 1986; Feinstein, 1990). 
Yet the original estimates by Sir George Paish (1911) and Herbert Feis (1965 [1930]) remain widely accepted. 
6 Information on short-term positions is much less complete. On the basis of very rough estimates, one may add 
about three billion dollars in short-term assets (Bloomfield, 1963), raising global foreign assets in the world 
economy to 45-50 billion US dollars in 1913. 
7 A figure of 5.5 billion dollars can be found in United Nations (United Nations, 1949), but looks very high. If 
true, these countries would have had higher foreign investments relative to output than the UK. Twomey (2000, 
p. 32), prefers an older figure of 4.3 billion in current 1913 prices. This lower number was used here. It must be 
noted that these figures refer only to private long-term portfolio and direct investment.   8
historical GDP figures are later reconstructions. These have been done only for the developed 
core economies. For this reason, historical studies are forced to apply an admittedly crude 
method.
8 Maddison’s (Maddison, 1995; Maddison, 2001; Maddison, 2003) estimates for real 
GDP in constant 1990 “international”, i.e. purchasing power adjusted, dollars were “deflated 
to historical market value” by the US GDP deflator. This method crucially hinges on a 
purchasing power parity (PPP) assumption, but it remains the best available approximation. It 
yields a historical world GDP of about 210 billion US dollars on the eve of WW1. This would 
bring the level of international financial integration (the ratio of gross international assets to 
world GDP in 1913) to around 20 per cent (Crafts, 2000; Obstfeld and Taylor, 2003). 
However, a simple comparison of historical GDP reconstruction with the deflated figures 
indicates that the market value of the output of the four largest developing countries – Russia, 
India, Japan and China – was considerably lower than the deflation method yields.
9 Clearly, 
the historical GDP reconstructions are not free of errors, either. Yet if we decide to trust the 
accuracy of the work of economic historians, the market value of the output of low-income 
countries in 1914 must have been considerably lower. Adjusting developing countries’ GDP 
downwards, the ratio of foreign investment assets (or liabilities) to world GDP is likely to 
have been substantially higher than 20 percent – probably closer to 30 percent. 
There can be no doubt that, measured by the Lane-Ferretti-Index, the overall degree of 
financial globalization is much higher today. Since the IMF's international investment 
position statistics do not yet cover a great many developing countries, the best way to derive 
the global volume of private cross-border investments in the years 2000 and 2001 is to sum 
international liabilities from different sources. This allows complementing industrial country 
                                            
8 Among others this was done in Obstfeld and Taylor (2003); Taylor (2002); Clemens and Williamson (2004). 
9 Own calculations based on Maddison’s figures (Maddison, 1995) deflated by the implicit US-GDP-deflator 
from Maddison (1995) and Mitchell (1993) as well as the historical GDP reconstructions from Chang (1962) for 
China, Gregory (1982) for Russia, Bordo and Jonung (1996) for Japan and Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) for Brazil 
and India.   9
investment position data by debt liabilities of developing countries from the World Bank 
(World Bank, 2004a,b), foreign direct investment data from UNCTAD (2004), equity 
investment from the IMF’s  portfolio investment survey (International Monetary Fund, 2003) 
and long-term loans of commercial banks from the Bank of International Settlements (Bank 
for International Settlements, 2004).
10 According to these sources, global liabilities, i.e. 
inward investment stocks of portfolio debt and equity instruments, foreign direct investment 
as well as long-term bank loans, stood at about 27,500 billion dollars – or about 75 per cent of 
world GDP at market prices in the year 2001. In the years 2002 to 2004, international 
investments continued to grow faster than world output, so that this figure can be assumed to 
have been close to or even above the 100 percent threshold by end-2004. Relative to world 
output the degree of international financial integration is thus about two to three times higher 
today than in the first era of globalization (table 1).  
 
Table 1 about here 
Table 1: International investment stocks in two eras of financial globalization 
 
in current US dollar billion         
      global investment stocks  world GDP  stocks/world GDP 
1913/1914 total    45  210  0.22 
end-2001 total    23335  31100  0.75 
         
Sources: for 1914 stocks Wilkins (1989), Twomey (2000) and Woodruff (1966); GDP from Maddison (1995, 
2001) deflated by the implicit US-GDP deflator from Mitchell (1993) and Maddison (1995). For 2001 foreign 
direct investment stocks from UNCTAD (2004), bank loans from the Bank for International Settlements 
(2004), portfolio instruments from the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey of the IMF (2003). GDP data 
from the World Bank (2004a). 
 
 
II. Disintegration of developing economies from the global financial market 
 
Looking more closely at the patterns of global investment before 1913 and after 1990, the first 
question we ask is which countries were the main recipients of international investment flows 
                                            
10 UNCTAD (2004) values foreign direct investment at historical cost (as do historical statistics). The figure 
would be about 20-30 percent higher if foreign direct investment would be valued at market price.     10
in both eras? Table 2 gives an answer. Given the size of the economy it is unsurprising that 
the US come out on top of the list. More astonishing are the differences further down on the 
list. In 1914, 7 out of the 12 most important recipients of foreign capital were less-developed 
economies: Russia, Brazil, Mexico, India, South Africa, China and Spain. If one adds 
Argentina as a relatively wealthy but hardly industrialized country, 9 out of the top-12 
destinations of international investment before 1914 can be counted as developing economies. 
In the year 2001, only one less-developed economy can be found among the 12 most 
important destinations for international investment flows – China comes out slightly ahead of 
small Switzerland. The most obvious difference between now and then is that the western 
European economies do not appear at all on the historical list, but belong to the most 
important recipients of foreign investment today.  
 
Table 2 about here 
Table 2: Main recipients of foreign investment 
   
US dollar billion  1913/14   %      cumulative  2001  %  cumulative
USA 7.1  15.8  16   USA 6277  26.9  27
Russia 3.8  8.4  24   United  Kingdom 2204 9.4  36
Canada 3.7  8.2  32   Germany 1866 8.0  44
Argentina 3  6.7  39   France 1431  6.1  50
Austria-Hungary 2.5  5.6  45   Netherlands 1027 4.4  55
Spain 2.5  5.6  50   Italy 943 4.0  59
Brazil 2.2  4.9  55   Japan 871 3.7  63
Mexico 2  4.4  60   Belgium/Luxemb. 741  3.2  66
India and Ceylon  2  4.4  64   Hong Kong 608  2.6  68
South Africa  1.7  3.8  68   Canada 597  2.6  71
Australia 1.7  3.8  72   China 534 2.3  73
China 1.6  3.6  75   Switzerland 521 2.2  76
             ...        
             Brazil 443  1.9   
             India 130  0.6   
Note: The figures for end-2001 refer to international liabilities from direct and portfolio investments and long-term 
bank loans. 
Sources: For 1913/14 the source is Wilkins (1989). For 2001 the data for portfolio debt investments are taken from 
the International Financial Statistics of the IMF (2004), foreign direct investment data come from the World 
Investment Directory of UNCTAD (2004), loans from commercial banks are taken from the Bank for International 
Settlements (2004a). Debt data for Brazil, China and India were calculating using World Bank statistics: World 
Bank (2004a). Equity investments were derived from the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey of the IMF 
(2003).   11
The list of the top-12 recipients seems to suggest that less-developed countries as a group 
account for a smaller share of global investments today. Yet before we can calculate 
aggregate figures, we need to make sure that a consistent definition of “developing countries” 
is applied in both periods. Two different classificatory approaches are plausible. First, we can 
classify an economy as less-developed, if its GDP per capita is less than a third of the 
advanced core economies (roughly in the middle of each globalization period, i.e. in 1900 and 
1995).
11 Second, we can look at the distribution of international investment by geographic 
world regions. 
Applying the (relative) income classification, what share of international investment was 
located in poor countries in 1913? According to historical statistics, out of a total of roughly 
42 billion US dollars, countries with a per capita income of less than one-third of the core 
economies accounted for some 20 billion US dollars or approximately 48 percent of total 
international investment stocks in 1913 (using the data from Feis,1965 [1930] and Woodruff, 
1966). This figure is considerably higher than the one derived by Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) 
who arrived at a low-income share of 29 percent.
12 However, the data for British capital flows 
that were published recently by Stone (1999) support a higher figure. Stone’s data show that 
the share of developing countries in British foreign investment was 39 percent, only 
marginally lower than the 42 percent the older stock data show. Since the share of less-
developed countries in the outward investment stocks of the other main capital exporters 
                                            
11 The threshold of one third of the rich core is chosen in approximation of current World Bank practice: the 
Bank’s upper limit for the classification as a “developing country” comes very close to a GDP per capita of one 
third of the high-income OECD countries. For the pre-WW1 area, the reference countries are the UK, France, 
Germany and the US. For the contemporary period it is the high-income OECD country aggregate according to 
the World Bank. Our historical sample covers 49 countries, 28 of which were treated as less developed, because 
of a per capita income of less than 1,300 international dollars in 1900. The modern sample covers 138 countries, 
105 of which had a per capita income below the threshold of 8,000 international dollars. The full list of countries 
can be found in the data appendix.  
12 Unfortunately, it is not clear how this figure was derived. The data are taken from “unpublished worksheets” 
of Prof. Twomey, University of Michigan at Dearborn. Prof. Twomey confirmed in mail correspondence that a 
total amount of 20 billion dollars is more realistic.    12
(such as France and Germany) was considerably higher, a figure between 40-50 per cent is 
plausible.  
A comparative look at the distribution of international investments at the end of the 20th 
century shows that the contrast between now and then is stark – regardless of minor quibbles 
over the accuracy of pre-WW1 investment statistics. At roughly 2,900 billion US dollars, 
investment liabilities of countries with a GDP per capita of less than one third of the high-
income (OECD) countries accounted for only 12.5 percent of global investment stocks in the 
years 2000 and 2001 (table 3). By historical standards, poor countries are marginalized in the 
contemporary global financial market.  
 
Table 3 about here 
Table 3: Share of poor countries in international investment 
 
  
in current US dollar billion  stocks  of which in less 
developed economies 
share in % 
          
1914          
   United  Kingdom 19.32  7.92  41 
   United  States  3.5  1.48  42 
   France  8.88  6.10  69 
   Germany  5.82  2.74  47 
    Others  4.3                             ~ 2.0  47 
 total    41.82  20.24  48 
          
2001          
   foreign  direct  investment  6845  1650  24 
    bank loans (long-term)  7175  444  13 
   portfolio  debt  5374  308  6 
   portfolio  equity  3942  520  6 
 total    23335  2922  12.5 
          
Note and sources: aggregation according to GDP per capita in 1900 and 1995 from Maddison (1995, 2001) 
and World Bank (2004a). Sources for contemporay data see text and table 1.  
 
 
The picture remains essentially the same, if we look at the distribution of international 
investment by geography. Unlike its historical predecessor, current financial globalization is a 
process that takes place predominantly between developed economies. While the shares of 
North America, i.e. the US and Canada, and Asia (including Japan) have remained unchanged   13
at 15 percent and 10 percent, respectively, the great disintegration from the global financial 
market place has taken place in three less-developed world regions: Latin America, Africa 
and Eastern Europe. Those regions accounted for two fifths of foreign investment stocks 
before 1913, but for not even 10 percent today (table 4). Western Europe has gained market 
share at their expense. Every second international dollar was invested in Western Europe in 
2001, compared to not even 15 percent on the eve of WW1.   
 
Table 4 about here 
Table 4: Geographical distribution of cross-border investment stocks 
        
% of total international liabilities       
   1913/14  2001  change,  %-points 
Western Europe*    13.3  50.4  37.1 
Eastern and South-Eastern 
Europe** 
13.9 1.6  -12.3 
Africa   9.9  1.1  -8.8 
Asia (Non-Japan)    9.5  8.6  -0.9 
Japan   2.0  3.3  1.3 
Latin America*    20.3  5.1  -15.2 
North America*    25.2  28.3  3.1 
Australia and New Zealand  5.6  1.7  -3.9 
* excluding off-shore financial centers.     
** includes Turkey.         
Sources: for 1913/14 Feis (1965) and Woodruff (1966). For end-2001: UNCTAD (2004) for direct 
investment, BIS (2004) for long-term bank loans and International Monetary Fund (2003) for stock of 
portfolio investments. 
 
It is possible, however, that our focus on investment stocks hides different dynamics on the 
flow side as many countries liberalized their capital accounts progressively in 1990s. Do flow 
data contain a dynamic element that is missed by the stocks? The answer is relatively 
unambiguous: they don’t. The share of poor countries in gross flows of foreign direct, debt 
and equity capital was on average 10 percent over 1990-2002. The highest share – confirming 
conventional wisdom about their greater developmental role – can be found for direct 
investments. Low-income countries received on average about 25 percent of global foreign 
direct investment flows over this period (chart 1). Cross-border portfolio flows have boomed   14
in the past decade and been a main driver of financial globalization, but the surge in “passive” 
cross-border finance has not spilled-over to low-income regions. New issues of debt securities 
have quadrupled between 1994 and 2002, reaching more than a trillion USD per year (BIS, 
2004). But the new issues of capital-poor countries have by and large stagnated, not in relative 
but in absolute terms.  
 







































FDI Portfolio debt and equity Total
Chart 1: share of poor countries in international investment 
flows (1990-2000) 
Sources: IMF (2004) and World Bank (2004a)
 
 
II. A portfolio model of global investment stocks 
 
In the first globalization almost every second pound of British investment found its way to 
low-income destinations. Today, only about every tenth internationally mobile dollar reaches 
poor countries. The 20
th century has thus witnessed a relative disintegration of developing 
countries from the world capital market. Yet these changes in the patterns of international 
investment may simply reflect a bigger share of advanced economies in world output. 
Standard models of portfolio diversification suggest that the share of a country in international 
investment stocks should be roughly proportionate to its income (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996; 
Reinhart and Reinhart, 2003).    15
A simple model of portfolio optimization could thus help to determine if investment patterns 
have only followed the changes in the relative size of economies. To test this, we construct an 
index (INT) that relates the share of a country in international investment to its share in world 
GDP. It is defined as the share of a country’s gross foreign liabilities (GFL) in total 




    
t w, t i,
t w, t i,
t i, = INT          ( 2 )  
The index is independent of changes in the overall level of international financial integration. 
An index value of 1 signals that the country hosts the amount of foreign capital that 
corresponds to its share in world GDP. Table 5 shows that the patterns of global financial 
integration have changed markedly. In the contemporary world economy, developing 
economies are much less integrated than the simple portfolio model predicts. Developing 
countries’ share in global output is higher than their share in international investment stocks. 
Before 1914 quite the opposite was the case: developing countries were host to a larger part of 
international investment than of global GDP. In the course of the past century, developing and 
developed countries have changed their relative positions. The first globalization was an era 
when poor countries were well integrated into the global market. The mutual investments 
between rich economies were extremely low before 1914 (with the partial exception of the 
US), whereas their financial ties to the periphery were close. International capital flows were 
predominantly rich-poor in direction, just like standard textbooks would suggest. Today’s 
globalization can instead be characterized as a “rich-rich affair” (Obstfeld and Taylor, 2003, 
p.174), dominated by massive diversification flows between rich economies and low rich-
poor flows. While international financial integration has risen on a global level (from 20-30 
percent of world GDP in 1914 to roughly 100 percent today), this increase is almost 
exclusively due to much closer financial ties between developed economies.  
   16
Table 5 about here 
Table 5: International financial integration index 
 
                    
      1913           2000    


















                       
Argentina 6.26  1.07  5.84      0.83  0.94  0.88 
Brazil 5.64  0.73  7.69      1.75  2.68  0.65 
Chile 0.91  0.34  2.66      0.31  0.45  0.69 
Mexico 4.56  0.81  5.61      1.10  1.72  0.64 
                       
Russia 8.20  8.59  0.95      0.71  3.73  0.19 
Turkey 3.14  0.47  6.68      0.49  0.97  0.51 
                       
China 2.76  11.13  0.25      1.89  22.76  0.08 
India 4.85  7.55  0.64      0.49  5.38  0.09 
                       
Egypt 1.89  0.23  8.28      0.19  0.46  0.41 
South Africa  5.00  0.36  13.71     0.30  0.50  0.61 
                       
Average        5.23           0.48 
                       
Japan 1.96  2.65  0.74      6.74  7.49  0.90 
                       
France 0.92  5.29  0.17      6.89  3.44  2.00 
Germany 0.90  5.36  0.17      9.42  3.97  2.37 
United 
Kingdom 
1.84 7.91  0.23      16.69  3.34  5.00 
United States  14.72  19.16  0.77     27.63  21.38  1.29 
                       
Average (excl. Japan)     0.34           2.67 
Sources: own calculations based on GDP figures from Maddison (1995, 2001)) in 1990 international dollars 
(PPP), and gross foreign investment data from Woodruff (1966) and Wilkins (1989) for 1913/14. For 2000, the 
total gross inward investment stock is the sum of external debt, portfolio equity and foreign direct investment 
from World Bank (2004a), IMF (2003) and UNCTAD (2004). For the G-5 the corresponding data refer to total 
inward stocks of portfolio debt, equity and other investment from IMF (2004), and UNCTAD (2004). GDP in 
constant 1190 international dollars from Maddison (1995, 2001) and World Bank (2004a). 
 
 
Have foreign capital-to-output ratios actually decreased in poor countries? The data are 
sketchy, for the simple reason that historical GDP estimates for developing countries are rare 
and not very reliable. But for some important less-developed economies, such figures can be 
calculated. To illustrate the margin of error that needs to be accepted when compiling such 
statistics, we present two series from different sources (table 6). But a clear trend emerges. In 
most less-developed countries the ratio of foreign capital to output was higher on the eve of   17
WW1 than it was in the year 2000. The secular decline is most obvious in South America and 
in former British colonies such as India, South Africa and Malaysia. A (modest) increase can 
be observed in a number of Asian countries. Comparing the simple arithmetic average in 1913 
(about 100 percent of GDP) and 2000 (about 60 percent of GDP), one could be led to 
conclude that in the first globalization developing countries were more strongly penetrated by 
foreign capital than the world economy as a whole, whereas today poor countries have fallen 
far behind the degree of international financial integration reached on the global level.  
 
Table 6 about here 
Table 6: Foreign capital stocks of individual countries 
in % of GDP          
   1913a  1913b  2000 
India* 27  35  13 
Russia 33     34 
Egypt 134  105  26 
South Africa  123  235  57 
Brazil 111  92  66 
Chile 67  197  127 
Argentina 129  248  62 
Uruguay 172      75 
           
Mexico     126  42 
China     24  41 
Turkey     98  34 
Indonesia     51  77 
Malaysia     148  105 
Philippines     53  53 
South Korea     14  31 
Thailand     40  59 
           
Average 100  105  57 
*includes Ceylon for 1913 stocks       
           
Note: The first column for the year 1913 was calculated based on the figures from Woodruff (1966) and 
historical GDP data figures from Mitchell (1992, 1993, 1995), Gregory (1982) and Obstfeld and Taylor 
(2003). Column 1913b is based on Twomey (2000). The discrepancies are sometimes large, caused mainly by 
different GDP estimates. The year-end 2000 figures refer to total stocks of foreign direct, portfolio debt and 
equity investments as well as long-term commercial bank loans. Portfolio equity stocks were calculated as the 
sum of inflows since 1980. All data, including GDP at current US dollars come from the World Bank (2004a), 
except for foreign direct investment stocks from UNCTAD (2004). 
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III. The “Lucas paradox” in historical perspective 
 
An interesting perspective on the patterns of international investment is offered by the so-
called Lucas paradox of neoclassical growth theory. In his seminal paper, Robert Lucas 
(1990) has pointed to the paradox that investment flows to poor countries fall far short of 
what standard neoclassical growth models predict. If remotely correct, such models would 
imply astronomical returns to capital in poor regions which should lead to massive capital 
inflows as soon as formal barriers are dismantled. Yet in reality, quite the contrary seems to 
be the case. Low income levels are correlated with low investment inflows (Lane and Ferretti, 
1999). This can be called a “wealth bias” of international investment, but from the perspective 
of poor countries it could also be called a “poverty trap”: the lower the initial income, the less 
likely a country is to profit from the opportunities offered by global financial integration 
(Clemens, 2001).  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to try to give an explanation for the wealth bias of 
international investors. Alternatively, what we can do is to look at the phenomenon in a 
comparative historical perspective. Has the “wealth bias” existed before? Has it been less 
pronounced in the first financial globalization?  
Chart 2 and Chart 3 display the relationship between GDP per capita and capital inflows per 
inhabitant for the years 1890 to 1914 and 1990 to 2001 (all figures in logs and transformed to 
constant 1990 dollars). The visual inspection of the correlation between investment inflows 
and income level clearly shows that the patterns differ. Inflows and wealth levels are more 
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To explore the elasticities in greater detail, we run a cross-sectional regression to estimate the 
relationship between the initial income level and subsequent capital inflows. Such a direct 
comparison of two distant epochs on the basis of scarce data is difficult, but could nonetheless 
be illuminating. In our first estimation, capital inflows per head are regressed on income, 
measured in GDP per capita at the beginning of each globalization period, and a constant   20
(table 7).
13 Regressions (1) and (2) show that in both eras of global capital market integration 
higher initial GDP per capita was statistically associated with higher capital inflows – thus, 
whatever the causes of wealth bias, it was present a hundred years ago. Rich countries in both 
eras attracted relatively more capital. Yet there is a striking difference with regard to the 
overall variance of flows per capita that can be "explained" by GDP per capita: only 15 
percent of the variation of capital inflows per head can be attributed to the wealth level in the 
age of the classical gold standard. The relationship is much stronger today as about 70 percent 
of the variation is accounted for. Initial wealth fares far better in explaining the ability of 
countries to attract foreign capital in the current globalization era. Moreover, if we limit the 
comparison to portfolio investment – excluding foreign direct investment flows – the 
elasticity of the coefficient on GDP per capita turns out to be about twice as high today (3 and 
4). We obtain essentially the same result if we scale average annual capital inflows by the 
recipient country’s GDP (5 and 6), or add GDP as a regressor to account for the effects of 
market size (7 and 8). 
On a first glance, these findings contradict Clemens and Williamson (2004) who found that 
the “wealth bias” of international investment was even stronger in the first capital market 
boom. Their finding has been questioned by other authors (Obstfeld and Taylor, 2004, p.245), 
because the alleged high elasticity seems to be mainly driven by some influential outliers in 
the sub-period chosen by Clemens and Williamson, 1908-1913 vs. 1992-1997. Moreover, 
Clemens and Williamson did not normalize the dependent variable, but chose to regress gross 




                                            
13 This is to avoid endogeneity problems. GDP per capita series for some of the countries in the historical sample 
start later than 1890. In such cases, the earliest available date was chosen, typically 1900.    21
Table 7 about here 
Table 7: Capital flows and income level ('wealth bias')                
































         excl. FDI             
intitial GDP per capita 
(log) 
1.34 1.95  2.70 0.78 1.51 0.93  7.92 
   t-statistics  2.76*** 17.74***  18.25***  0.98 4.97***  1.29  4.62*** 
GDP                 -0.005  -0.001 
   t-statistic                 3.03***  1.57 
Constant -3.48  -5.32  -8.74  -1.41  -23.58  -1.62  -24.82 
   t-statistic  2.29** 12.73***  15.07***  0.57 4.68***  0.72  4.39*** 
N 36  111  91  36  112  36  112 
R-squared  0.15 0.71  0.66 0.02 0.18 0.10  0.18 
Note: least squares estimation, White heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors; *** denotes statistical 
significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level. 
Sources: historical flow data from Stone (1999) and Clemens and Williamson (2004), GDP from Maddison 
(1995, 2001). Modern data from IMF (2004), population and GDP from World Bank (2004a). See text. 
 
 
IV. Net capital flows to poor countries 
 
From the perspective of development economics the main rationale for international capital 
mobility is the possibility of net capital flows to poor countries. By opening up to the global 
capital market, developing economies could invest more than they save and hence free 
themselves from a binding constraint on economic development. For an increase in the 
investment ratio, capital must flow to developing countries on a net basis. It is thus important 
to ask how sizeable net capital flows from rich to poor countries were in both eras. 
Yet net capital flows are difficult to measure. Detailed data on capital inflows to and outflows 
from less-developed countries (often somewhat misleadingly labeled ‘capital flight’) are not 
available for the first globalization era. This leaves us with an indirect method to estimate net 
capital movements using the current account balances of the developed economies (adjusted 
for reserve changes). By definition, the adjusted current account balance equals net capital   22
flows to or from an economy. If we treat the world economy as consisting of a poor and a rich 
part and add up the current account balances of countries of one part, we obtain an estimate of 
net capital flows to the other part. The method is rough, but enables us to obtain estimates that 
would otherwise be unobtainable because of data constraints. We can also apply this method 
to net international investment positions, i.e. to investment stocks at a given point in time: 
aggregating the investment position of the developed economies vis-à-vis the rest of the 
world, i.e. less-developed countries, returns the net debtor position of poor countries. To 
classify countries as rich or poor, we use the (relative) income as described above, but a 
geographical classification again yields similar findings. 
The behavior of the aggregate current account balance of the developed economies supports 
the idea of massive net capital transfers from rich to poor in the first globalization. Between 
1880 and 1913, the developed countries in the sample exported on average capital of about 1-
1.5 percent of their GDP per year (table 8). Although some of the advanced economies such 
as Australia, Canada and the US were capital importers for most of the time, the sizeable 
surpluses of the other developed economies kept the high-income aggregate well in positive 
territory, leading to substantial net capital outflows to the rest of the world, i.e. to less-
developed economies (table 8).  
Turning to the contemporary period, the picture is again markedly different. Given the 
discrepancies in contemporary world balance of payments statistics, the volume of net capital 
flows from rich to poor depends on the calculation method. Aggregating the current account 
balances of the advanced economies shows that they were net capital importers between 1992 
and 2002 (by about 0.2 percent of their GDP). However, if one aggregates the current account 
balances of developing countries, net capital flows from rich to poor seem become positive, 
but they were much smaller than in the first era (only 0.2 percent of the advanced countries’ 
GDP).  Even by this generous measure – it is unlikely that all the statistical error is on one 
side – advanced countries’ net capital flows were thus about two or three times lower than in   23
the first capital market boom when the developed nations exported more than 1 percent of 
their GDP per year to poor countries. Data restrictions prevent us from relating capital imports 
to developing country GDP for the decades before WW1. Yet according to Maddison’s data, 
the contribution of less-developed countries to world GDP has remained relatively stable over 
the past century (at roughly 40 percent of world GDP). This would imply that also in relation 
to poor country GDP, net capital flows are much smaller today.  
 
Table 8 about here 
Table 8: Net capital exports* of high-income countries 1890-1914 vs. 1990-2001 
period average, % of GDP          
   1890-1914     1990-2001   
        I  II 
1890-1894 0.8  1990-1995  -0.4  0.6 
1895-1899 1.4  1996-2001  -0.4  0.4 
1900-1904 1.2        
1905-1909 1.4        
1910-1913 1.1         
1890-1913  1.2  1990-2001  -0.4 0.5 
*Net capital exports equal current account balance less increase in reserve stock. Data in the historical sample 
cover the United Kingdom, the US, Germany, France, Canada, Australia, Denmark, Norway, Italy, 
Switzerland, Sweden and Argentina. Discrepancy in the modern sample between columns I and II due to 
errors in world BoP statistics. Modern data refer to the aggregate of 33 high-income countries with a GDP per 
capita of more than 8,000 international dollars in 1995 (see text). 
I = calculated using current account data of high-income countries from IFS. 
II = calculated using current account data of low-income countries from IFS. 




With regard to net international investment positions, historical statistics are unfortunately 
fragmentary with regard to the international liabilities of rich countries in 1913. However, one 
can follow Bloomfield (1963) as well as Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) by arguing that the 
unaccounted (mainly short-term) liabilities of the main European creditor nations in 1913/14 
were rather small compared to their massive long-term assets. As a consequence, it would be 
permissible to assume that aggregate net foreign assets of the rich economies were rather   24
close to their gross foreign assets in developing countries (Obstfeld and Taylor, 2003). 
Leaving some margin for foreign holdings of European bills, 18-19 billion US dollars are a 
realistic range for the net international creditor position of the rich in 1913. This would 
correspond to 15-20 percent of their aggregate GDP in this year (table 9). 
On contrast, by year end-2000 the aggregate international investment position of the high-
income countries displays a net debtor position of 660 billion US dollars or 2.5 percent of 
their GDP. The largest international debtor in nominal terms is the United States, but this is 
arguably a special case. Excluding the US (i.e. effectively including their net foreign assets in 
the less-developed country aggregate) the high-income countries become international 
creditors again, but by a much smaller share of their GDP than in the first globalization. Their 
net claims on the rest of the world equaled only about 6 percent of their GDP compared to 15 
to 20 percent before 1914. In other words, even when the US is treated as a special case, the 
differences between now and then remain stark. Only Switzerland disposes of net foreign 
assets comparable to those it had in 1913 (127 percent of GDP).  
Table 9 shows that gross foreign asset and liability positions of the rich countries are large, 
but they cancel each other out. The countries with the highest assets are also those with the 
highest liabilities, resulting in almost flat net positions. Unlike in the first globalization, era 
rich countries did not build up large one-way positions in the past years: “Today’s asset 
distribution is much more about asset “swapping” by rich countries – diversification – than it 
is about the accumulation of large one way positions – a critical component of the 
development process in poorer countries in standard textbook treatments” (Obstfeld and 
Taylor, 2003, p. 174).  
In sum, net capital flows from rich to poor are small today and net international investment 
positions are by and large flat. In the past decade financial liberalization has not led to a 
noteworthy transfer of capital from rich to poor. In contrast, before WW1 poor countries 
borrowed substantial amounts from the more developed countries – on a net basis. Financial   25
globalization in the 1990s seems to have facilitated the diversification of assets and liabilities, 
but it has failed to offer new net sources of financing capital in poor economies (Aizenman, 
Pinto et al., 2004). 
 
Table 9 about here 
Table 9: Net international investment positions 1914 vs. 2000     
% of GDP           
  1914     2000  
 Net  foreign 
assets 






USA -9    75  91  -16 
United Kingdom  153    315  318  -3 
Germany 36    139  135  3 
France 97    188  182  6 
Switzerland  139    567 440 127 
Netherlands na    312  328  -16 
Italy na    104  100  4 
Canada -135    79  99  -20 
total 20    92  93  -1 
 
Sources: historical data from Goldsmith (1985), Woodruff (1966), Twomey (2000), GDP from Mitchell 






The preceding lines had to be read with the Schumpeterian dictum in mind that the value of 
statistics is not only to explain, but also to find out what needs to be explained. The 
comparison of the patterns of international investment in two eras of financial globalization 
has yielded more differences than similarities. In both periods, capital was highly mobile and 
little formal barriers impeded its global allocation. Yet the overall patterns of global 
investment differed markedly in both eras. Several conclusions can be drawn.  
First, a secular increase in international financial integration has taken place in the course of 
the 20
th century. Relative to world output, cross-border investments are considerably larger 
today than ever before. Yet this increase has not been transmitted to developing countries. A 
long-term historical perspective on global investment patterns shows a relative disintegration   26
of developing economies. So far, only mutual investments between rich countries have 
increased dramatically, rich-poor capital flows remain far below historical levels. In 1913, 
British investors had placed less of their foreign investments in France and Germany 
combined than in a country like Uruguay. Today, British investments in France are larger than 
all British emerging markets investments together.  
Second, already a hundred years ago, investors found it more attractive to invest in rich 
economies than in poor countries. Nonetheless, different forces seem to be at work in both 
eras: back then, the wealth level of an economy was a much weaker predictor for the amount 
of capital inflows than today.  
Third, global financial liberalization in the 1990’s has not triggered large-scale net capital 
transfers from rich to poor. Current account balances have remained more or less flat. If we 
decide to trust the historical investment and balance of payments data, the core advanced 
nations had built up enormous one-way positions in their investment books before WW1. 
Such large bets on the development of the poorer half of the world are absent from rich 
countries’ investment books today. 
Financial globalization is back, but with a very different face. The patterns of international 
investment in both “globalizations” suggest that – looking at the hopes that were associated 
with the integration of poor countries into the global capital market – the glass is half-empty 
rather than half-full. The historical lesson that emerges from the comparison is that financial 
globalization can be and has been a benign force for development. However, the 
contemporary world economy has a long way to go to capture the potential benefits of 
international financial integration. These findings call for a better understanding of the 
circumstances under which large-scale development finance became possible in the first era 
of financial globalization. Financial history might have more important lessons to teach.    27
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Appendix 
 
Appendix: Country samples             
                 
1900   N=49  1995  N=138        
Developed Less-developed  Developed Less-developed      
Argentina Brazil  Australia  Albania  Gambia,  The  Nicaragua 
Australia Bulgaria  Austria  Algeria  Georgia  Niger 
Austria Burma  Belgium  Angola  Ghana  Nigeria 
Belgium Ceylon  Canada  Argentina  Guatemala  Pakistan 
Canada China  Czech  R.  Armenia  Guinea  Panama 
Chile Colombia  Denmark  Azerbaijan Guinea-Bissau  Papua  Guinea 
Denmark Cuba  Finland  Bangladesh  Haiti  Paraguay 
Finland Egypt  France  Belarus  Honduras  Peru 
France Ghana  Germany  Benin  India  Philippines 
Germany India  Greece  Bolivia Indonesia  Poland 
Greece  Indonesia  Hong Kong  Botswana  Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 
Romania 
Italy Japan  Hungary  Brazil  Jamaica  Russian 
Federation 
Netherlands Korea  Ireland  Bulgaria  Jordan  Rwanda 
New 
Zealand 
Malaysia Israel  Burkina  Faso  Kazakhstan  Senegal 
Norway Mexico  Italy  Burundi  Kenya  Sierra  Leone 
Spain Morocco  Japan Cambodia Kyrgyz  Republic  South  Africa 
Sweden Peru  Korea,  Rep.  Cameroon Lao  PDR  Sri  Lanka 
Switzerland Philippines  Kuwait  Central  African 
Rep. 
Latvia Sudan 
UK Portugal  Netherlands  Chad  Lebanon  Syrian  Arab 
Republic 
US Rhodesia  New 
Zealand 
Chile Lesotho  Tajikistan 
Uruguay Russia  Norway China  Lithuania  Tanzania 
   Serbia  Portugal  Colombia Macedonia,  FYR  Thailand 







   South Africa  Singapore  Congo, Rep.  Malawi  Trinidad and 
Tobago 
   Thailand  Slovak 
Republic 
Costa Rica  Malaysia  Tunisia 
   Turkey  Slovenia  Cote d'Ivoire  Mali  Turkey 
   Venezuela  Spain  Croatia  Mauritania  Turkmenistan 
   Vietnam  Sweden  Dominican 
Republic 
Mauritius Uganda 
      Switzerland  Ecuador  Mexico  Ukraine 
      United Arab 
Emirates 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  Moldova  Uzbekistan 
      United 
Kingdom 
El Salvador  Mongolia  Venezuela, RB 
      US  Eritrea  Morocco  Vietnam 
      Uruguay  Estonia  Mozambique  Yemen, Rep. 
         Ethiopia  Namibia  Zambia 
         Gabon  Nepal  Zimbabwe 
Note: Classification based on GDP per capita in 1900/1995; see text.       
 